A China-linked espionage group exploited a critical VMware vCenter zero-day for more than two months before Broadcom patched it on 19 November. The flaw, CVE-2026-123890, scores 9.8 out of 10. One day after the patch, CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, giving US federal agencies until 23 November to remediate it. That deadline binds US federal civilian agencies. For everyone else running vCenter, the KEV listing is the warning: exploitation is confirmed and the patch is out.
Mandiant, which reported the bug to Broadcom, attributes the exploitation to ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected PRC-nexus actor formerly tracked as UNC5221 and also known as Warp Panda. The group used a custom tool called BONESAW to steal the database that holds vCenter’s identity material, extract the keys that sign admin tokens, and create its own administrator account. Patching closes the flaw. It does not undo what the attackers took.
What the flaw lets an attacker do
CVE-2026-123890 is an unauthenticated Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key disclosure over DCE/RPC in the VMware Directory Service, vmdird. A remote, unauthenticated attacker with network access to vCenter can obtain the shared session key and create an authenticated session as administrator@vsphere.local. From there, the attacker can execute arbitrary commands and acquire files, including the data.mdb database, through the vmdird RPC interface vmdirdbcp.
That is the whole attack in one paragraph: no password, no login, no user interaction. Network access to the vCenter server is enough. The flaw is in the cryptographic logic of VMware’s rpc_srp_verifier service over port 2012, which exposes the session key because of predictable UUIDv1 timestamp generation in the SRP authentication interface. Broadcom’s advisory, VMSA-2026-0009, does not mention in-the-wild exploitation. The exploitation finding is Mandiant’s, not Broadcom’s.
BONESAW, then SAWSNAKE
ARMORY CASTLE gained initial access through CVE-2026-102764, a recently patched BeyondTrust Remote Support zero-day, then pivoted to Linux appliances on the internal network and targeted vCenter in early September 2026. The group deployed five newly identified malware families and utilities on the Linux appliances: the SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH webshells, the BEARBONES backdoor, the BONESAW exploitation utility, and the SAWSNAKE SAML utility. It also deployed the LAZYBONES backdoor, previously seen in a separate ARMORY CASTLE intrusion.
BONESAW, written in Golang, uses CVE-2026-123890 to exfiltrate the Lightning Memory-Mapped Database (LMDB), hijack the SAML Security Token Service, and create a single sign-on administrator account. It works against vCenter 7.x and 8.x. It can also stream the raw LMDB file for offline parsing, extract the SAML STS private RSA signing key, create a backdoor machine account via vmdir, forge administrative SAML 2.0 assertion tokens, and assign Global Administrator privileges on the vCenter root folder through the vSphere SOAP API.
Shortly after BONESAW ran, the attackers deployed SAWSNAKE to forge SAML tokens and conduct Golden SAML attacks against vCenter. A forged token bypasses multi-factor authentication and lets the attacker impersonate any user. The attackers also took the vCenter master encryption key and database credentials, then moved to an ESXi host, enumerated VMFS volumes, extracted guest VM files including Windows NTDS, SYSTEM, SECURITY and DNS data from a VM disk, staged the loot in a hidden .a directory, and likely exfiltrated it through the compromised Remote Support appliance, according to Mandiant. Mandiant investigated multiple incidents involving this exploitation, and its CTO, Charles Carmakal, said on LinkedIn that the company had investigated several of them.
The 130-day clock
| When | What happened |
|---|---|
| 13 Jul 2026 | Recovered BONESAW binary records a build timestamp of 2026-07-13T09:21:24Z. |
| Early Sep 2026 | ARMORY CASTLE exploits CVE-2026-123890 against a vCenter server, about two and a half months before any patch existed. |
| 19 Nov 2026 | Broadcom patches the flaw (VMSA-2026-0009), 129 days after the recorded build timestamp. |
| 20 Nov 2026 | CISA adds CVE-2026-123890 to KEV, 130 days after the recorded build timestamp. |
| 23 Nov 2026 | Federal civilian agencies’ remediation deadline, 4 days after the patch and 3 days after the KEV listing. |
The asymmetry is the story. The attackers’ clock ran for roughly two and a half months unopposed, from early September to the patch, and the recorded build timestamp sits 129 days before disclosure. Once the patch finally landed, the federal deadline gave agencies just four days. Months of silent exploitation, days to remediate. That is the shape of a zero-day that was burned quietly and disclosed late.
Patching the July flaws did not stop it
Mandiant has evidence that ARMORY CASTLE knew of CVE-2026-123890 before the disclosure of CVE-2026-59309 on 29 July 2026. BONESAW was executed in early September against a vCenter server already patched for CVE-2026-59309, and the recovered Go binary carries a build timestamp of 13 July, 16 days before CVE-2026-59309 was disclosed. Mandiant notes that Go build metadata can be modified before compilation, so the timestamp is evidence, not proof. But the sequence is clear: patching the July flaws did not stop this attack, because this was a different flaw.
The two flaws share some overlap, mainly obtaining the shared session key “K” without knowing the password, but they differ in mechanism. CVE-2026-59309 is a flaw in the vmdir daemon reachable through crafted LDAP packets on TCP ports 389 or 636. CVE-2026-123890 is a flaw in the vmdir DCE/RPC interface, exploiting predictable UUIDv1 timestamp generation in the SRP authentication interface. They are not the same bug, and they should not be conflated.
CVE-2026-59309 and CVE-2026-59310 were disclosed on 29 July 2026, and in mid-August Quirso said an APT had exploited CVE-2026-59310 against about 360 web-accessible vCenter servers — that report did not name the actor. CVE-2026-41709, a low-severity ESXi logging flaw, was added to CISA KEV in late October 2026. CVE-2026-102764, the BeyondTrust zero-day that opened this campaign, was disclosed on 15 October. From 29 July to 19 November is 113 days. Four separate VMware disclosures in that window, but the July flaws and the ESXi logging flaw are not attributed to ARMORY CASTLE in the reporting reviewed here.
What to do now
Patch vCenter now, then rotate your SAML signing keys and hunt for compromise. The patch alone does not close this incident: the attackers stole the keys that forge admin tokens, so a patched server can still be re-entered. Check for the BONESAW and SAWSNAKE artefacts Mandiant published.
- Patch vCenter to 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 or 8.0 U3m now — federal agencies must finish by 23 November.
- Rotate your SAML signing keys, since the attackers stole the keys that forge admin tokens.
- Hunt for BONESAW and SAWSNAKE artefacts, including LMDB theft, forged SAML tokens and backdoor accounts.
- Check every ESXi host the compromised vCenter managed, since the attackers moved there as well.
- Plan the move off vCenter 7.0 now, since no generally available public fix exists for that version.
- Review every administrator account created since September, and remove any account that you cannot explain.
Broadcom released fixes in vCenter 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200 and 8.0 U3m. There is no workaround. There is also no generally available public fix for vCenter 7.0, which reached end of general support in October 2025; customers with an extended support contract should contact Broadcom Support. The advisory also resolves four other flaws: CVE-2026-123891, an SQL injection in SDDC Manager; CVE-2026-123892, an authenticated command injection in SDDC Manager; CVE-2026-123893, a local privilege escalation to root in SDDC Manager; and CVE-2026-123894, a SAML token signature bypass in VMware Tools for Windows. The other four score between 6.7 and 8.1.
“Organizations should both apply the patches and examine their systems for evidence of compromise,” Carmakal said. That second half is the point. A patched vCenter with stolen signing keys is still compromised until the keys are rotated and the forged accounts are found.
What is still unknown
How many organisations were hit. Mandiant investigated multiple incidents but disclosed no victim count, no named victims, and no count of affected vCenter deployments. No exfiltration volume has been confirmed, and the reporting reviewed does not identify a publicly released exploit or proof of concept. CISA lists known ransomware campaign use for CVE-2026-123890 as “Unknown”, so this flaw should not be linked to any ransomware campaign. The “Chinese APT” label is Mandiant’s “suspected PRC-nexus” assessment; the reporting reviewed does not establish official US government confirmation of state responsibility.
What to watch next
Whether federal agencies meet the 23 November deadline, and whether CISA or Mandiant publishes victim counts or further indicators; whether a public proof of concept appears, which would widen the attacker pool beyond ARMORY CASTLE; and whether the KEV listing drives patching in the private sector, where no federal deadline applies. This article will be updated as Broadcom, CISA or Mandiant confirms more.


